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Motivational theories of choice focus on the influence of goal values and strength of reinforcement 
to explain behavior. By contrast relatively little is known concerning how the cost of an action, 
such as effort expended, contributes to a decision to act. Effort-based decision making addresses 
how we make an action choice based on an integration of action and goal values. Here we 
review behavioral and neurobiological data regarding the representation of effort as action 
cost, and how this impacts on decision making. Although organisms expend effort to obtain 
a desired reward there is a striking sensitivity to the amount of effort required, such that the 
net preference for an action decreases as effort cost increases. We discuss the contribution 
of the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) toward overcoming response costs and in enhancing 
an animal’s motivation toward effortful actions. We also consider the contribution of brain 
structures, including the basal ganglia and anterior cingulate cortex, in the internal generation 
of action involving a translation of reward expectation into effortful action.
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2005). Thus, ducks choose between walking or flying depending 
on optimal solution of net gain between energy requirements in 
walking or flying and the food gained (Bautista et al., 2001).
In what follows we discuss a literature that has endeavored to 
understand the neural mechanisms of effort and reward integra-
tion, including the involvement of dopamine (DA) in effort-based 
behavior. This literature points to the basal ganglia, particularly 
dorsal and ventral striatum, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as 
the principal substrates in both representing and integrating effort 
and action implementation. Finally, we suggest that pathologies in 
effort expenditure, the paradigmatic instance being the clinical phe-
nomenon of apathy, can be characterized behaviorally as impair-
ment in representing action–outcome association and neurally as 
a disruption of core cortico-subcortical circuitry.
The regulaTory role of dopamine in efforT
Over the past three decades, theories concerning the role of midbrain 
DA on behavior have changed dramatically. The hedonic hypothesis 
of DA (Wise, 1980) is now challenged by empirical evidence revealing 
that global DA depletion (including within the accumbens, a major 
recipient for DA) does not impair hedonic (‘liking’) responses to pri-
mary rewards such as orofacial reactions, the preference for sucrose 
over water, or discrimination among reinforcement (Berridge et al., 
1989; Cousins and Salamone, 1994; Cannon and Palmiter, 2003). 
On the other hand the same lesions profoundly impair performance 
of instrumental tasks necessary to obtain rewards that are liked 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998). These observations have led to 
a formulation that the contribution of DA includes an effect on 
motivated behaviors toward desired goals, a concept referred to as 
“wanting” (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). “Wanting” (Table 1) can 
be expressed in simple instrumental responses, such as button or 
lever presses or in a more expanded form of behaviors which require 
an agent to overcome action costs. As demonstrated unequivocally 
by Salamone and colleagues (Salamone and Correa, 2002; Salamone 
“So she was considering in her own mind […], whether the pleasure 
of making a daisy-chain would be worth the trouble of getting up 
and picking the daisies…”
Alice in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,” Carroll, (1865, p. 11)
Effort is commonly experienced as a burden, and yet we readily 
expend effort to reach a desired goal. Many classical and contem-
porary studies have assessed the effect of effort expenditure on 
response rates, by varying experimental parameters such as the 
weight of a lever press, the height of a barrier to scale, or the num-
ber of handle turns needed to generate a unit of reward (Lewis, 
1964; Collier and Levitsky, 1968; Kanarek and Collier, 1973; Collier 
et al., 1975; Walton et al., 2006; Kool et al., 2010). There is general 
agreement that animals, including humans, are disposed to avoid 
effortful actions. It is paradoxical then that effort is not always 
treated as a nuisance, and there are instances where its expenditure 
enhances outcome value as observed in food palatability (Johnson 
and Gallagher, 2010), likability (Aronson, 1961), and indeed the 
propensity to choose a previously effortful option (Friedrich and 
Zentall, 2004). What is most surprising is the observation that effort 
often biases future choice toward effortful actions (Eisenberger 
et al., 1989).
Laboratory results show that if reward magnitude is held con-
stant then high-effort tasks tend to be avoided (Kool et al., 2010). 
Yet, in daily life most organisms seem superficially indifferent to 
the varying costs of action and readily choose challenging tasks 
to achieve a desired goal (Duckworth et al., 2007). Such observa-
tions point to the presence of a mechanism that integrates effort 
costs with benefits in order to implement desired actions (see 
Floresco et al., 2008b for review on various cost–benefit analyses 
and Salamone et al., 2007 for an earlier review on dopamine and 
effort). This perspective has been addressed by optimal foraging 
theory. It is known that animals will strive to maximize gain whilst 
minimizing energy expenditure (Bautista et al., 2001; Stevens et al., Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  2
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reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Reinforcement 
learning offers ways to formalize the process of reward maximiza-
tion through learned choices and has a close resonance with the 
neuroscience of decision making (Montague et al., 1996; Montague 
and Berns, 2002; Niv et al., 2005; Daw and Doya, 2006). In particular, 
phasic responses of macaque and rodent midbrain dopaminergic 
neurons to rewards, and reward-associated stimuli, are akin to a 
reward prediction error signal within reinforcement learning algo-
rithms, responding to unexpected rewards and stimuli that predict 
rewards but not to fully predicted rewards (Schultz et al., 1997; 
Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007). 
Moreover, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
report that the BOLD signal in the striatum, a major target of the 
dopaminergic system, correlates with the prediction error signals 
derived from fitting subject’s behavior to a reinforcement learning 
model (Mcclure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003, 2004). In support 
of such a role for dopamine in reinforcement learning processes, 
stimulation of the substantia nigra (using intracranial self-stimula-
tion paradigm) has been shown to induce a potentiation within cor-
ticostriatal synapses at the site where nigral output cells terminate, 
with these effects in turn being blocked by systemic administration 
of a DA D1/D5 antagonist (Reynolds et al., 2001). Importantly, the 
magnitude of potentiation is negatively correlated with the time 
taken by an animal to learn the self-stimulation paradigm.
Dopamine is also proposed to signal stimulus salience, as opposed 
to reward prediction error (Redgrave et al., 1999). Redgrave et al. 
(1999) have discussed the stereotypical latency and duration of  phasic 
bursts of nigral dopaminergic neurons, as well as the   connectivity 
et al., 2003; Salamone, 2007), accumbens DA depletion disrupts 
instrumental responding if the responses require an energetic 
cost such as climbing a barrier (Salamone et al., 1994), but leaves 
reward preference intact when effort is minimal. This has led to an 
hypothesis that DA plays a role in overcoming “costs” (Salamone 
and Correa, 2002; Phillips et al., 2007).
alTernaTive views on The role of dopamine in 
decision making
There are several alternative views to dopamine which we summa-
rize in Figure 1. Aside from a role in the expression of motivated 
behavior, DA is also involved in its acquisition through learning. An 
influential view on how dopamine influences behavior comes from 
Figure 1 | The figure illustrates a range of views regarding the role of 
dopamine in facilitating motivated behavior. Clockwise from top left 
corner: a wealth of evidence shows that DA acts to invigorate an agent’s 
effortful action, integrating ideas about overcoming effort costs, agents’ 
choice for high-effort options as well as modeling work on vigor. Another 
influential view pertains to DA acting as a signal for a prediction in reward as 
exemplified by its role in reinforcement learning. An alternative view interprets 
this signal as a saliency signal which allows agents to implement associative 
learning. Finally, dopamine may facilitate flexible switching and re-engagement 
in relation to reward-driven behavior. The summarized perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive, nor do they represent the entire literature on dopamine, 
but are useful in understanding what determines motivated behavior.
Table 1 | Key concepts.
Key word Definition/related concepts
Effort Strenuous physical or mental exertion typically 
with the aim of achieving a desired outcome or 
goal.
Liking A set of behaviors driven by hedonic or 
pleasurable properties of a stimulus, such as the 
smell or taste of a valued food item. Typical liking 
responses in rodents include orofacial reactions 
while in humans likability is operationalized 
through degrees of attractiveness measured on 
a Likert scale. A characteristic of likability is that it 
needs not be motivational nor sensitive to 
devaluation procedures.
Wanting A set of behaviors driven by salient properties of 
a stimulus often manifests in a disposition to 
overcome costs in order to obtain an incentive. 
Wanting often entails actions such as lever 
pressing in rodents or non-human primates to 
obtain a goal object. One influential hypothesis 
regarding dopamine function highlights a role in 
mediating wanting, but not liking.
Cost-benefit integration The process of deriving a value of an action 
based on a combination between potential utility 
in attaining and disutility incurred in so doing. 
There is evidence that this type of integration 
takes place when one is judging whether an 
action is worth taking, although the mechanisms 
by which costs and benefits are integrated 
remain unclear. 
Apathy A mental or behavioral state devoid of motivation 
with a core feature of lack of self-initiated 
actions.
Invigoration To vitalize or increase strength. One hypothesis 
regarding the role of dopamine formalizes its role 
as facilitating motivated behavior by invigorating 
an organism when faced with increasing 
demands of effort. This is supported by studies 
that highlight the effects of a dopaminergic 
manipulation on effort expenditure.www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  3
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of cortico-subcortical networks for cost–benefit decision making 
as highlighted in depletion effects (Cousins and Salamone, 1994; 
Aberman and Salamone, 1999; Salamone et al., 2007). In these 
experiments, rats are trained on a T-maze that requires choosing 
between two actions; one yields high reward (four pellets of food) 
but requires higher effort (climb a 30-cm barrier or higher lever 
press fixed-ratio schedule), the other yields low reward (two pellets 
of food) but requires less effort. DA depletion in the NAc changes a 
rat’s preference away from the high-effort/high reward option, but 
does not impact on reward preference when it is readily available, 
nor does it alter response selection based on reward alone (Cousins 
and Salamone, 1994; Salamone et al., 1994). This finding has been 
replicated in other laboratories with a variety of depletion meth-
ods (Denk et al., 2005; Floresco et al., 2008a), where some studies 
point to a stronger effect from depletion in the core as opposed to 
shell of the NAc (Ghods-sharifi and Floresco, 2010; Nicola, 2010).
The impact of DA elevation on effort is much less conclusive. 
Enhancing DA function is commonly realized through injection 
of amphetamine, an indirect DA agonist that increases synaptic 
DA levels (but also that of other neuromodulators). Floresco et al. 
(2008a) revealed a dose-dependent effect of amphetamine such 
that low-doses of amphetamine increased effortful choice, but high 
dose decreased it. This dose-dependent effect is difficult to inter-
pret. First of all, it is unclear what the precise effect of a high dose 
of amphetamine is on DA concentration level since amphetamine 
also results in increased extracellular serotonin and noradrenaline 
(Salomon et al., 2006). Moreover, it is unclear whether a low dose of 
amphetamine acts by increasing the value of the reward, decreasing 
the cost of an action, modifying the integration of both, or by affect-
ing other components of behavioral control such as impulsivity 
(see Pine et al., 2010 in relation to the latter). Nevertheless, the data 
suggest that increasing DA levels per se does not invariably enhance 
preference for a high reward/high-effort option, ruling out a simple 
monotonic relationship between DA and effort.
Another study showed an interactive effect of haloperidol, a DA 
receptor blocker, and amphetamine. While an injection of halo-
peridol 48 h before treatment, followed by saline 10 min before 
test, significantly reduced preference for high reward/high-effort 
arm, giving the same haloperidol injection followed by ampheta-
mine 10 min before testing blunted the effect of haloperidol, and 
completely recovered preference for high reward/high-effort arm 
(Bardgett et al., 2009). Evidence therefore points to amphetamine’s 
ability to overcome the effects of DA blockade induced by halo-
peridol. However, as indicated amphetamine also increases the 
levels of serotonin and noradrenaline as well as DA levels, making 
it difficult to completely outrule a possibility that the effect might 
relate to elevations of other amines aside from DA. We also know 
that amphetamine increases locomotor activity (Salomon et al., 
2006) and it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that a recovered 
preference for the high-effort arm found might be due to enhanced 
locomotion.
Recent advances in neurochemical assay techniques, particularly 
in vivo fast scan cyclic voltammetry, allow detection of DA tran-
sients with a temporal resolution of milliseconds in awake behaving 
animals (Robinson et al., 2003; Roitman et al., 2004). Gan et al. 
(2010) performed in vivo voltammetry while rats selected between 
two options in a task where there was an independent  manipulation 
between nigral dopaminergic neurons and sensory subcortical 
structures such as the superior colliculus. They argue that activity of 
dopamine neurons can be interpreted as reporting biological salient 
events, either due to novelty or unpredictability. From this perspec-
tive, salient events generate short-latency bursts of dopaminergic 
activity that reinforce actions occurring immediately preceding the 
unpredictable event. This signal allows an agent to learn that an 
action caused the salient event (see Redgrave and Gurney, 2006 for an 
elegant discussion on signal transmission in tecto-nigral and cortico-
subcortical pathways for learning of action–outcome associations). 
According to this view, unpredictable rewarding events are just one 
among many exemplars of a salient event.
Finally, Nicola (2010) recently suggested that DA is required to 
flexibly initiate goal-directed instrumental responses. This view is 
based on observations that the effects of DA depletion in the rat 
nucleus accumbens (NAc) are dependent on inter-trial interval, 
such that when this is short instrumental responses are not affected 
but disruption increases as a function of increasing time between 
responses. Detailed behavioral analysis shows these effects of time 
are explained by the fact that as the duration between responses 
increases animals tend to engage with behaviors different from 
the required instrumental response, with depleted animals unable 
to flexibly reinitiate execution of the instrumental responses. On 
the other hand, depleted rats can perform complex sequences of 
behavior in situations where these are not interrupted. Such find-
ings suggest that rather than impairing lever presses, dopamine 
depletion disrupts an animal’s ability to flexibly re-engage with a 
task after engaging in a task-irrelevant behavior.
exTending reinforcemenT learning To accounT for 
dopamine involvemenT in efforT
The most compelling attempt to link the known role of DA in reward 
learning to effort is that of Niv et al. (2007) who have developed 
a model that specifies the vigor (defined as the inverse latency) of 
action. This model realizes a trade-off between two costs: one stem-
ming from the harder work assumed necessary to emit faster actions 
and the other from the opportunity cost inherent in acting more 
slowly. The latter arises out of the ensuing delay to the next, and 
indeed to all subsequent, rewards. Niv et al. (2007) suggested that 
agents should choose latencies (and actions) to maximize the rate 
of accumulated reward per unit time, and showed that the result-
ing optimal latencies would be inversely proportional to the aver-
age reward rate. Based on a review of experimental evidence, Niv 
et al. (2007) proposed that tonic levels of DA report the average rate 
of reward, thus tying together prediction error (Montague et al., 
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Mcclure et al., 2003), incentive salience 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998), and invigoration (Salamone and 
Correa, 2002) theories of DA. As defined by Niv et al. (2007), vigor 
can be thought of as a specific manifestation of effort expenditure in 
the time domain. Future work might usefully extend this temporal 
computational concept of vigor into other aspects of physical effort.
dopamine and iTs role in overcoming efforT cosTs
Considerable evidence points to midbrain DA depletion discourag-
ing animals from choosing effortful actions (Cousins and Salamone, 
1994; Aberman and Salamone, 1999; Denk et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 
2007). A series of experiments in rats has pointed to the crucial role Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  4
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BG output nuclei (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Frank et al., 2004; 
Frank, 2005; Frank and Fossella, 2011). Under basal conditions, the 
output nuclei of the BG have a high level of firing and maintain 
thalamic inhibition that serve to dampen activity in corticostriatal 
loops (Frank, 2005). The distinct connectivity of direct and indirect 
pathways (see Figure 2) results in opposite effects: the direct pathway 
promotes inhibition of BG output nuclei and release of inhibition in 
thalamic activity whereas the indirect pathway promotes excitation 
of BG output structure and drives thalamic inhibition.
Neurons within the direct pathway express D1 dopamine recep-
tors, promoting cell activity and long-term potentiation (LTP), 
whereas neurons of the indirect pathway mainly express D2 dopa-
mine receptors which promote cell inhibition (when activated) and 
long-term depression (LTD). This scheme means that an increase 
in striatal DA tends to promote activity in the direct pathway and 
inhibition of the indirect pathway, resulting in net disinhibition of 
the thalamo-cortical connections and the generation of behavioral 
output. On the other hand a decrease in striatal DA promotes exci-
tation of the indirect pathway resulting in dampening of activity 
in thalamo-cortical loops and behavioral inhibition. A segregation 
between striatal neurons that form the direct and indirect pathway 
means increases in dopamine potentiate the direct pathway while 
inhibiting the indirect pathway, thus facilitating thalamic output 
and corticostriatal flow. On the other hand a decrease in dopamine 
promotes inhibition of the direct pathway and an excitation of the 
indirect pathway, dampening thalamic output and shutting down 
corticostriatal information flow. Finally, to complete a picture of 
the BG circuitry we need to include reference to an hyperdirect 
pathway from inferior frontal cortex to the STN, a circuit that sends 
excitatory projections to output nuclei of the BG (Frank, 2006). 
of the amount of reward and effort. These authors found that rats 
had the expected preference for higher magnitude of reward when 
costs were held constant and higher preference for options which 
require less effort when reward magnitude was constant. This study 
also included a separate set of trials which offered rats either option, 
while measuring the amount of DA released in the core of the NAc 
elicited by cues predicting reward and effort. By having this set 
of non-choice trials the authors ensured that the dopaminergic 
response was not confounded by the presentation of the second 
option. Whereas DA release reliably reflected the magnitude of the 
reward available in these trials, the amount of effort required to 
obtain the goal was not coded in the amount of DA released in the 
core of the NAc. This lack of evidence for an integration between 
costs and benefits in the dopaminergic signal was surprising given 
the extent of prior evidence (discussed above) pointing to a link 
between DA and the expenditure of effort in overcoming costs.
Overall, there is evidence that DA is required to overcome costs 
when high levels of effort are necessary to obtain a desired goal. 
However, the precise mechanism by which DA supports a cost-over-
coming function, and how effort is integrated into a dopaminergic 
modulation of the striatum and prefrontal cortex, is much less clear. 
In addition, dopamine depleted animals can engage in high-effort 
responding given a limited, inflexible set of possible responses but 
exhibit difficulties and are slower in re-engaging with simple one-
lever presses where multiple responses are allowed (Nicola, 2010). 
Whilst dopamine may be key to the computation and execution of 
highly effortful tasks, its role in strategic flexibility (Nicola, 2010) 
suggests it exerts a more subtle contribution to the complex rela-
tionship between task demands and the integration of task-relevant 
and task-irrelevant behavior.
We next consider the likely contribution of basal ganglia (BG) 
and ACC, and the formation of action–outcome association neces-
sary for motivated behavior.
Basal ganglia: anaTomy and physiology
The basal ganglia are a set of subcortical nuclei comprising dorsal 
(putamen and caudate nucleus) and ventral aspects (often syn-
onymous with NAc), the internal (GPi) and external (GPe) seg-
ments of globus pallidus, substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), 
and reticulata (SNr) as well as the subthalamic nucleus (STN). The 
BG receives afferents from almost all cortical areas, especially the 
frontal lobe. Information processed within the BG network is sent 
via output nuclei (the internal segment of the globus pallidus and 
substantia nigra pars reticulata) to the thalamus, which eventu-
ally feeds back to frontal cortex (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; 
Bolam et al., 2002). This basic circuitry is reproduced in differ-
ent parallel and integrative corticostriatal loops, with their origin 
in different frontal domains, and is held to play a critical role in 
cognitive functions that span motor generation to more cognitive 
aspects of causal learning, executive function and working memory 
(Frank et al., 2001; Frank, 2005; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Vitay 
and Hamker, 2010).
Neurons in the striatum project either to output nuclei of the BG 
(GPi and SNr) or to an intermediate relay involving GPe neurons 
which ultimately project to BG output nuclei. These two populations 
provide the origin of BG direct and indirect pathways which funnel 
information, conveyed in parallel to striatum by cortical afferents, to 
Figure 2 | A schematic model of direct and indirect pathways of Bg 
(adapted from Frank et al., 2004). The principal input of BG is the striatum, 
receiving excitatory inputs from most cortical areas. The output nuclei of BG 
are GPi/SNr, which direct processed information to the thalamus to eventually 
feed back an excitatory projection to the cortex. Within this circuitry, there are 
two pathways: a direct pathway expresses D1 receptors and indirect pathway 
expresses D2 receptors. D1 striatal neurons inhibit GPi/SNr cells forming the 
direct pathway. D2 striatal cells inhibit an intermediate relay, the GPe which 
ultimately provides inhibition to GPi/SNr. Under basal conditions, GPi/SNr cells 
fire at high level and maintain inhibition of the thalamus which in turn dampens 
corticostriatal loops activity. The different direct/indirect connectivity results in 
opposite effects: inhibitory effect on GPi/SNr and release of inhibition in 
thalamic activity by the direct pathway and excitatory effect on GPi/SNr and 
inhibitory effect on thalamus by the indirect pathway.www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  5
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pared to the rest of striatum. First, it is involved in unconditioned 
responding in the appetitive and aversive domains, spanning feeding 
(Kelley et al., 2005), and maternal behavior (Li and Fleming, 2003) 
to defensive treading (Reynolds and Berridge, 2002). Moreover, the 
NAc shell is involved in invigorating effects of dopamine on con-
ditioned behaviors controlled by the NAc core (Parkinson et al., 
1999). Second, the shell is the only striatal subdivision project-
ing to lateral hypothalamus (Pennartz et al., 1994, and reviewed 
by Humphries and Prescott, 2010), a key structure in an “action–
arousal” network. Note lateral hypothalamus also exerts an influ-
ence over autonomic function and contains orexin-producing cells 
which influence arousal and energy balance control (see Ikemoto, 
2007 for a comprehensive review). Third, whereas amygdala has 
extensive projections to both the core and shell (Humphries and 
Prescott, 2010), the NAc shell is the only recipient of hippocampal 
afferents within the striatal complex (Wickens et al., 2007; Haber 
and Knutson, 2010). This restricted projection from hippocampus 
has generated extensive discussion concerning the unique role of 
ventral BG in spatial navigation, fear-modulated free-feeding, and 
acquisition of stimulus value through stimulus–outcome pairings 
(Humphries and Prescott, 2010). These lines of evidence point to 
the shell as critical in forming linkages between an object/event in 
the environment and the agent’s natural response toward it.
An alternative interpretation of the anatomical and physiological 
organization of the BG is a selection and control model (Gurney 
et al., 2001). In this model inputs for selection and control are 
received separately by striatal D1 receptors and D2-like receptors, 
respectively. D1 transmission is then projected as inhibition to GPi/
SNr which acts as an action selection output, whereas D2 trans-
mission inhibits GPe which acts as an output layer for a control 
mechanism. The control output layer, in turn modulates action 
selection: GPe inhibits activity GPi/SNr output nuclei. Akin to 
inhibitory mechanisms described in the direct/indirect BG model, 
this selection/control BG model also describes inhibitory relation-
ships between nuclei in BG. It is not clear what the thalamic inhibi-
tory/excitatory impacts are on movement. Nevertheless this model 
highlights an important role for BG in action selection and control. 
More recently, Nicola (2007) has discussed the potential role of 
NAc in such a model, particularly in disinhibiting motor efferents 
for one action and inhibiting motor efferents for another, thereby 
allowing action selection.
Basal ganglia and efforT-relaTed processes
To facilitate execution of motivated behavior, one needs to inter-
nally represent action costs and benefits. Using fMRI, Croxson et al. 
(2009) investigated where in the human brain effort and reward are 
represented. Participants saw a discriminative stimulus signaling an 
action with a particular cost and benefit and then completed a series 
of finger movements using a computer mouse, to gain secondary 
reinforcers. The cost, in terms of effort and time, increased as more 
finger movements were completed, whilst the benefit increased 
as the secondary reinforcer was larger. When anticipating these 
actions, striatum activity correlated with both anticipated costs 
and anticipated reward of effortful actions.
More recent fMRI studies have replicated an involvement of 
striatum in effort-related processes, reporting higher dorsolateral 
striatal activity for choosing low compared to high-effort options 
The contribution of this pathway to behavioral control has been 
discussed extensively (Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Frank, 2006) and 
is beyond the scope of the present review.
anaTomical and funcTional gradienTs in The 
sTriaTum
The functional organization of BG along the direct and indirect 
pathways, as described above, applies to the full extent of the stria-
tum, forming an integral re-iterated processing matrix which per-
forms common operations across different subdivisions (Wickens 
et al., 2007). Although there are suggestions of a dorsal–ventral seg-
regation, the consensus favors a dorsolateral–ventromedial gradient 
(Voorn et al., 2004) with no sharp anatomical distinction between 
dorsal–ventral areas. Indeed, based on the cytology of spiny pro-
jection neurons, dopaminergic inputs, and dopamine-modulated 
plasticity and inhibition, dorsal and ventral striatum are strikingly 
similar (Wickens et al., 2007). However, there is evidence for a func-
tional segregation such that dorsolateral striatum, receiving senso-
rimotor afferents, supports habitual, stimulus–reward associations. 
This contrasts with ventromedial striatum, receiving afferents from 
orbito and medial prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala, 
which supports formation of stimulus–action–reward associations 
(Voorn et al., 2004; Haber and Knutson, 2010).
A functional gradient in dopamine signaling is also described in 
BG (Wickens et al., 2007). DA release is determined by density of 
DA innervation (densities reduce the distance between release and 
receptor sites), such that higher innervation densities are necessary 
for rapid DA signaling. DA clearance is regulated by density of 
DA transporters (DAT), hence affecting distance and time course 
of volume transmission. Wickens et al. (2007) has documented 
greater DA innervation and higher DAT densities in dorsolateral 
striatum with these densities decreasing along a ventromedial gra-
dient (also Haber and Knutson, 2010). High densities of release sites 
and DAT result in fast clearance in dorsolateral striatum, which 
may be related to encoding of discrete events involving reinforced 
responding, or even automatized and habitualized behaviors. 
Ventromedially, lower densities of DA innervation and DAT result 
in slow clearance in NAc core, and even slower clearance in NAc 
shell, which may be related to slower time course of action–outcome 
evaluation (Wickens et al., 2007; Humphries and Prescott, 2010).
Moreover, it is noteworthy that within the ventromedial subdivi-
sions of the striatum, the NAc has interesting particularities. The 
NAc is subdivided, on the basis of anatomical and histochemical 
features, into the core and the shell, with the latter more medial and 
ventral in location than the former (Voorn et al., 2004; Ikemoto, 
2007; Humphries and Prescott, 2010). This core/shell distinction 
is particularly important when considering the role of BG in moti-
vated behavior.
The NAc core is similar to dorsal striatum (Humphries and 
Prescott, 2010, but see Nicola, 2007 on role of dorsal–ventral stria-
tum in temporal predictability). Functionally, NAc core seems criti-
cal in the translation of raw, unconditioned stimulus value, into a 
conditioned response. Thus, NAc core plays an important role in 
conditioned behavior (Ikemoto, 2007), such as autoshaping in classi-
cal conditioning paradigms and conditioned reinforced responses in 
instrumental learning paradigms. On the other hand, the NAc shell, 
the most ventromedial aspect of striatum, has unique features com-Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  6
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visual discrimination task, but instead was specific to an inability to 
utilize reward–action association to make the correct response. In a 
different experiment, monkeys with ACC lesion were impaired in 
selecting a set of response when the correct responses were deter-
mined by an integration across past contingencies between action 
and reward (Kennerley et al., 2006). In addition, using fMRI, human 
ACC was found to be most active when participants had to simulta-
neously internally generate a sequence of actions whilst monitoring 
the outcome of their actions (Walton et al., 2004).
Lesions studies with rodents using the T-maze consistently show 
impairments in effort-based decision making following removal 
of ACC. As with dopamine depletion experiments, these lesions 
result in a shift of preference away from an option with a larger 
food reward that requires scaling a high barrier, thus requiring 
more effort. This reduced preference for larger/effortful arm was 
not due to lethargy or immobility as it is immediately restored 
when both arms have equal effort costs (Denk et al., 2005; Floresco 
and Ghods-Sharifi, 2007; Walton et al., 2009, but see Floresco et al., 
2008b for a discussion the extent to which ACC plays a role in 
effort-based tasks).
Human ACC lesions provide a more subtle interpretation for 
the role of ACC in effort processing. Naccache et al. (2005) tested 
a patient with a large lesion to left mesial frontal region including 
the left ACC using a, cognitively demanding, Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935). This patient could not verbally recognize nor express dis-
criminatory skin conductance responses in difficult trials where 
greater mental effort was required, but could perform as well as 
healthy controls. This case study suggests dissociability of objective 
cognitive performance from a physiological response and from 
the subjective appraisal of mental effortfulness (Naccache et al., 
2005, but see McGuire and Botvinick, 2010 for the involvement 
of lateral prefrontal cortex, instead of ACC, in a closer inspection 
of subjective experience of mental effort through intentional and 
behavioral avoidance from mentally challenging tasks).
The ACC is implicated in a host of cognitive processes, ranging 
from cognitive control to suppression of prepotent responses such 
as in Stroop or go–nogo tasks, tasks that induce negative emotions, 
and tasks that predict delivery of painful stimuli (see a review 
by Shackman et al., 2011). Shackman et al. (2011) discussed a 
challenge in advancing knowledge of its functional organization 
being the complexity of its anatomical organization and vari-
ability across individuals. For example, a tertiary sulcus in dorsal 
ACC, the paracingulate sulcus, is present in one-third of the popu-
lation, and its presence causes location change of architectonic 
Brodmann area 32′, and a volumetric reduction of Brodmann 
areas 24a′ and 24b′. Consequently, spatially normalized cingu-
late premotor regions differ across subjects, and an unmodeled 
cingulate sulcal variability may inflate the spread of activation 
clusters found across studies, rendering complex a clear functional 
dissociation within ACC.
Bush et al. (2000) proposed the rostro-ventral cingulate could 
be functionally segregated into cognitive and affective components 
located to dorsal and ventral ACC, respectively. This segregation 
seems too broad. Shackman et al. (2011) using a sample of almost 
200 neuroimaging experiments that included negative affect, pain, 
and cognitive control reported strongly overlapping activation 
clusters in dorsal ACC, or what they termed as middle cingulate 
in a physical effort task (Kurniawan et al., 2010) and higher ventral 
striatal activity in a low cognitive demand block compared to a 
high cognitive demand block in a mental effort task (Botvinick 
et al., 2009). Whilst, it is still unclear whether physical and cogni-
tive mechanisms of effortful actions reflect similar psychological 
and neural processes, together these studies provide support for 
the importance of striatum in effort-related processes. In the fol-
lowing section, we assess the type of association formed when an 
organism performs a motivated goal-directed behavior.
encoding acTion and iTs ouTcomes
Linking a chosen action to its outcome is central for optimal goal-
directed behavior. When a monkey travels a distance to forage for 
food, not only does it need to link contextual cues to food consump-
tion, for example associating a tree full of ripe fruits with eating 
fruits, it also needs to associate the action (climbing a tree) with 
the consequences of the action, namely the energetic cost of climb-
ing. Neurons in primate dorsal striatum, can be categorized into 
those that encode the action made by the monkey (direction of sac-
cade made) and neurons sensitive to the outcome of the monkey’s 
choice (reward/unrewarded; Lau and Glimcher, 2007). However, 
these neurons do not appear to support the kind of action–outcome 
association required for goal-directed behavior.
Using reinforcement learning models, similar to those used to 
characterize activity in DA neurons, Samejima et al. (2005) reported 
neurons in the striatum whose activity correlated with the value 
of an action. These action value neurons are important because 
they track the value of say, a left handle turn in a probabilistic two-
choice task, independent of whether the monkey ultimately selects 
the action, and thus provide input information for action selec-
tion. Furthermore, in a subsequent study, Lau and Glimcher (2008) 
found action value neurons, including neurons which traced the 
value of the chosen action, in the striatum. These chosen value neu-
rons show enhanced activity when the tracked action has a higher 
value and, on this basis, was subsequently chosen. Using similar 
reinforcement learning models, human fMRI studies also report 
that BOLD signal in the dorsal striatum correlate with the rela-
tive advantage of taking one action over an alternative (O’Doherty 
et al., 2004).
efforTful Behavior, acTion and iTs ouTcomes: 
implicaTion of The acc
These action and chosen value representations in the striatum 
are precisely the kind of association between action and outcome 
required for goal-directed behavior. However, the unanswered 
question is where does the information needed for this compu-
tation come from? One possibility is ACC, a region suggested to 
represent this action–outcome association (Rushworth et al., 2007). 
For example, Hadland et al. (2003) trained macaque monkeys to 
pull a joystick upward after receiving a type of food, say a peanut, 
in order to obtain a second peanut and to turn a joystick to the 
side after obtaining a different food type, say a raisin, to receive a 
second raisin. They found that while control monkeys could select 
an action based on this reward–response association, monkeys with 
a lesion to ACC were impaired in selecting the correct response. 
Interestingly, the impairment was not due to an inability to make 
an association between visual cues and reward as tested in a second www.frontiersin.org  June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  7
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severely impaired in execution of real-life events such as holding a 
job, although various measures of logical reasoning, general knowl-
edge, planning, and social and moral judgments proved intact. The 
authors discussed how the lesion did not impact on pure action 
execution, but on the analysis and integration of the costs and 
benefits pertaining to real-life situations.
apaThy and The execuTion of efforTful responding
Several distinct types of brain insult are associated with apathy in 
humans. For example, bilateral ACC lesions can present with aki-
netic mutism, a wakeful state characterized by prominent apathy, 
indifference to painful stimulation, lack of motor and psychological 
initiative (Tekin and Cummings, 2002). Apathy is also often pre-
sent in patients with subcortical brain lesions (involving BG), but 
is more commonly found in those with prefrontal, mainly ACC, 
lesions (van Reekum et al., 2005). In this section we draw upon 
findings with apathy to understand cost benefit integration and 
implementation of effortful choices.
Effort is a salient variable in individuals with apathy who lack 
the ability to initiate simple day-to-day activities (van Reekum et al., 
2005; Levy and Dubois, 2006). This lack of internally generated 
actions may stem from impaired incentive motivation: the ability 
to convert basic valuation of reward into action execution (Schmidt 
et al., 2008). Patients with auto-activation deficit (AAD), the most 
severe form of apathy, are characterized by lack of self-initiated 
action (van Reekum et al., 2005) or a quantitative reduction in self-
generated voluntary behaviors (Levy and Dubois, 2006). Thus, the 
key feature in AAD is an inability to internally generate goal-based 
actions, a deficit that may variously reflect an ability to (1) encode 
the consequence of an action as pleasurable or as having hedonic 
value (e.g., to attain reward, “liking”); (2) execute the action; and (3) 
represent the association between action and reward. We now discuss 
a proposal that the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying 
AAD are mostly intimately linked to the third sub-process.
Auto-activation deficit is not associated with impaired “liking” 
as patients with AAD have a normal skin conductance response 
to receipt of rewards and verbally distinguish between different 
magnitudes of monetary reward (Schmidt et al., 2008). In addi-
tion, the most prominent damage in AAD pertains to BG and the 
dopaminergic system. Secondly, AAD is probably not linked to spe-
cific impairments of action execution. Schmidt et al. (2008) tested 
patients with bilateral BG lesions with the history of AAD and 
found that, compared to normal and Parkinson’s disease control 
groups, patients with AAD are worse when generating voluntary 
vigorous actions based on contingent reward, but are equally able to 
generate the same motor response if based on external instructions. 
This provides evidence against AAD being explicable in terms of 
an impairment in pure motor action execution.
We suggest that AAD reflects an impairment in linking reward 
anticipation to action. Damage to BG in AAD most commonly 
involves a focal bilateral insult to the internal portion of pallidum 
(Levy and Dubois, 2006). Pessiglione et al. (2007) investigated 
the role of ventral pallidum in incentive motivation employing 
a task where individuals voluntarily squeezed a handgrip device 
in response to different reward magnitudes. Notably, the amount 
of voluntary force during squeezing was proportional to reward 
magnitude, suggesting that participants were able to identify a 
cortex (MCC), challenging a strict segregationist view of ACC (see 
Figure 3). These authors also pointed to evidence that the dorsal 
ACC might be involved in affective control, including autonomic 
regulation (Critchley et al., 2003) and pain processing, suggesting 
these findings may reflect an agent’s need for behavioral control 
when habitual responses are not sufficient under uncertain action–
outcome contingencies.
Anatomically, the ACC projects to striatum, particularly the 
caudate nucleus and portions of ventral striatum (Haber and 
Knutson, 2010). Moreover, ACC has bilateral connections to motor 
and prefrontal cortex fulfilling a role as a hub where action and 
outcome associations might be represented. In human and non-
human primates, the ventral cingulate have strong interconnections 
with ventral striatum including the NAc, whilst the dorsal cingu-
late connects more strongly to dorsal striatum including putamen 
and caudate (Kunishio and Haber, 1994; Beckman et al., 2009), 
potentially facilitating transmission of reward-related information. 
Furthermore, dorsal ACC is interconnected with premotor cortex 
and a more posterior part constitutes the cingulate motor area 
(Beckman et al., 2009) implicated in action selection (Picard and 
Strick, 2001). Shima and Tanji (1998) reported that cingulate motor 
areas in monkeys respond to selection of voluntary movement 
based on reward, supporting a role in linking internally generated 
action to reward. Indeed, a working hypothesis is that ACC could 
support adaptive control, integrating aversive, biologically relevant 
information in order to bias motor regions toward a contextually 
appropriate action (Shackman et al., 2011).
This wide-ranging anatomical connectivity between BG, ACC, 
and other cortical regions provide a neuroanatomical foundation 
for establishing action and outcome representations, of a type 
needed for motivated behavior. Normal function of this circuitry 
can be inferred to facilitate willingness to execute effortful actions. 
On the other hand, disruption of this circuitry, as in people with 
apathy, would discourage execution of such actions. This account 
has a resemblance to phenomena in a case study of a patient with 
a lesion to mesial prefrontal cortex (which included ACC) that led 
to profound apathy (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985). This patient was 
Figure 3 | Views on the psychological function of ACC. Left: ACC function 
has been suggested as anatomically segregated into a dorsal cognitive division 
and a ventral affective division (Bush et al., 2000). Right: more than a decade 
later, a meta-analysis on almost 200 fMRI experiments suggested a strong 
overlap in clusters of activation in studies of cognitive control, negative affect, 
and pain (Shackman et al., 2011). Figures adapted from Shackman et al. (2011).Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience    June 2011  | Volume 5  |  Article 81  |  8
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